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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
T HE following scenario has been recreated and retold countless
times, with far greater force and detail than this Comment could
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hope to achieve. Suffice it to say, when Hurricane Andrew ripped
through the southern tip of Florida on August 24, 1992, it wreaked
physical, economic, and social havoc on an unprecedented scale. Hur-
ricane Andrew's 150 to 180 mile-per-hour winds destroyed more than
60,000 homes and, in a matter of hours, left as many as a quarter
million people homeless.' Andrew inflicted between $16 to $18 billion
in property damage, making it by far the costliest natural disaster in
United States history.2 Miraculously, the bulk of Andrew's wrath
managed to spare the greater Miami area from major damage, which
insurers estimate might have tripled Andrew's already enormous price
tag . 3
It is a gross understatement to say that the potential destruction re-
sulting from a hurricane of Andrew's magnitude was largely unantici-
pated both by the citizens of South Florida and their state and local
governmental officials. After decades of relatively minimal hurricane
and tropical storm activity, South Florida's coastal residents received
a devastating dose of reality.4 The intensity and destructive power of
Andrew, as well as its sustained force after making landfall, was much
greater than calculated. In addition, Hurricane Andrew unearthed
shoddy construction practices and significant violations of the build-
ing codes in South Florida, as numerous homes which should have
remained substantially intact collapsed like matchbox houses.' In the
aftermath of Andrew, the displaced residents of South Florida began
looking to property and casualty insurers to fund the long process of
rebuilding. For the most part, the insurers answered that call, expend-
ing billions of dollars within the span of several weeks to stabilize the
hardest-hit areas. 6
However, the potential destruction of a hurricane such as Andrew
was also largely underappreciated by the insurance companies operat-
ing in South Florida.7 Like many other businesses, insurers had capi-
talized for a number of years on the construction boom in South
Florida by writing millions of dollars in property and casualty insur-
1. Larry Rohter, Hurricane Andrew: Supplies Flow In for Stricken Areas, But Delivery is
Slowed by Wreckage, N.Y. TEs, Aug. 27, 1992, at B9.
2. Thomas S. Mulligan, Quake Payout to be Insurers' 3rd Highest, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7,
1994, at IA; see also ch. 93-401 § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881 (official finding by Florida Legislature
that Hurricane Andrew caused more than $16 billion of insured loss).
3. Carl Hiaasen, Government Can't Be Trusted to Enforce Codes, MLAbu HERALD, Dec.
30, 1993, at BI.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake of Disasters, L.A. Tims, Sept. 22, 1993, at
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ance policies. In fact, in the race for market share many insurers un-
derpriced their product and charged rates which were inadequate to
cover potential hurricane losses.' In an instant, Hurricane Andrew in-
flicted almost twice as much monetary loss in hurricane claims as in-
surers had collected in premiums in Florida over the past twenty
years. 9 For example, Allstate, one of Florida's largest property insur-
ers, has offered insurance in the state since 1939.10 The amount of
money paid out by Allstate in response to claims resulting from Hurri-
cane Andrew exceeded the entire $1.9 billion it had received in prem-
iums during the fifty-three previous years." Hurricane Andrew
bankrupted ten of the state's insurers, meaning that the claims sub-
mitted by policyholders exceeded the capital surplus and reinsurance
set aside for those claims. 2 Those insurance companies that survived
quickly reanalyzed their potential risk of catastrophic loss in the event
of another hurricane, using Andrew as a model in recalculating an
acceptable level of exposure. 3 The larger insurers discovered that they
had simply overexposed themselves to excessive risk in the coastal
regions of hurricane-prone South Florida over the years. It became
clear that their level of exposure had to be cut back to reduce the risk
of catastrophic loss which otherwise might also put those residential
8. See Phillip Longman, The Politics of Wind: How Tallahassee's $36 Billion Insurance
Scheme Could Blow You Away, FLORIDA TREND, Sept. 1994, at 33, 36 (citing a recent report by
the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office which concluded that "the property and casualty
industry charges too little for the risk it assumes").
9. Christina Sherry, Florida Homeowners Feel Pinch As Insurance Companies Bail Out,
WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at A3 (estimated $10.8 billion collected in premiums from Florida
homeowners, but $18 billion incurred as loss).
10. Catherine Wilson, Floridians Slap Allstate on Plan to Drop Policies, DETRofT FRE
PRESS, May 19, 1993, at A5.
11. Id. (emphasis added). Daunting comparisons such as this place significant doubt upon
allegations that insurers who have proposed substantial cancellations and nonrenewals are acting
solely out of greed and in disregard for the public's welfare.
12. Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurance Firms Curbing Coverage for Homeowners- Coastal Ar-
eas Most Affected by Retrenchment, WASH. POST, May 8, 1993, at El. Some insurers were able
to escape permanent insolvency as a result of capital infusions from their parent companies. For
example, Prudential Property & Casualty Corp. (PRUPAC) had a capital base of $575 million
when Andrew struck, and eventually paid out claims of more than $1.3 billion. See David Satter-
field, Prudential Sues to Drop 25,000-Insurer Challenges State's Moratorium, MLAMI HERALD,
June 30, 1993, at Al. Thus, Andrew effectively bankrupted PRUPAC not once, but twice. Id.
Were it not for a capital infusion of $900 million by its parent corporation, Prudential Insurance
Co. of America, PRUPAC would have failed, and its policyholders would have been left empty-
handed to the tune of more than $600 million. Id. Note that Prudential was arguably under no
legal obligation to bail out its subsidiary, and if faced with the another disaster of Andrew's
magnitude, it may not be so willing to duplicate its actions.
13. Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake of Disasters, supra note 7.
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property insurers out of business . 4 This decision was characterized as
a "survival tactic" by some insurers, citing, among other reasons,
their obligations to policyholders in other states whose interests were
jeopardized by the threat of insolvency to insurers in the event of an-
other catastrophic hurricane in South Florida." Obviously, South
Florida consumers took a more cynical view of the insurers' motives. 6
Nevertheless, as a consequence of Andrew, large and small insurers
alike developed plans to reduce their exposure in South Florida-
plans which arguably were necessary to protect their remaining policy-
holders throughout the state and across the nation from a company's
insolvency in the event of another catastrophic hurricane. 7 Inevitably,
these plans called for significant cancellations and nonrenewals of ex-
isting homeowner's policies, or in the case of some of the hardest hit
insurers, withdrawal from the state's residential property and casualty
insurance market altogether."
Fully aware of the impending wave of policy cancellations and non-
renewals, the Florida Department of Insurance (DOI) began issuing
emergency rules in late August 1992 to limit the number of permissible
cancellations or nonrenewals of homeowner's insurance policies in
certain counties such as Dade and Broward.19 Beginning in November
1992, the DOI issued several emergency rules which addressed the
withdrawal by insurers from the residential property and casualty in-
surance market, and imposed certain terms and conditions on such
withdrawals." On May 18, 1993, in a purported attempt to ensure
market stabilization for residential homeowner's insurance, the DOI
issued Emergency Rule 4ER93-18, which imposed a six-month mora-
torium on the nonrenewal or cancellation of homeowner's insurance
14. Longman, supra note 8, at 36.
15. Sherry, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Until the enactment of section 627.7013, Florida Statutes (Phaseout Statute), an
insurer's right to effect cancellations and nonrenewals in connection with a formal withdrawal
notice pursuant to section 624.430, Florida Statutes (Withdrawal Statute), was basically unal-
tered. However, the DOI has interpreted the Phaseout Statute as superseding section 624.430,
Florida Statutes, thereby prohibiting an insurer's formal withdrawal from the residential prop-
erty insurance market if such withdrawal is related to the risk of hurricane loss. As discussed in
Part III of this Comment, this construction and application of the phaseout statute by the DOI
raises a number of serious constitutional objections.
19. 4ER92-2, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 5371 (Sept. 11, 1992); 4ER92-3, 18 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 5490 (Sept. 18, 1992); 4ER92-8, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 6223 (Oct. 16, 1992); 4ER92-14,
18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 6929 (Nov. 13, 1992); 4ER92-24, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7517 (Dec. 4,
1992).
20. 4ER92-11, 18 Fla. Admin. Weekly 7315 (Nov. 25, 1992); 4ER93-5, 19 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 969 (Feb. 26, 1993).
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policies for reasons related to the risk of hurricane loss. 21 Finally, on
June 8, 1993, after prompting by Governor Lawton Chiles and the
DOI, the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida
(Moratorium Law), which essentially imposed a six-month morato-
rium upon the cancellation or nonrenewal of homeowner's insurance
policies based on the risk of hurricane claims. The effect of the Mor-
atorium Law and the regulations leading up to it was to compel insur-
ers to renew the residential property and casualty insurance policies
they had in force, and to refrain from canceling any of those existing
polices. This subjected the insurers' depleted resources to the risk of
catastrophic loss for another twelve months, and consequently, an-
other hurricane season.
To be sure, these drastic measures were prompted by Hurricane An-
drew, and one might argue persuasively that they were justified to a
certain extent by the need to protect the economic and social stability
of the state and its citizens, particularly those in South Florida and
along coastal regions. It is critical to note that the issues raised by the
Moratorium Law do not exist in a vacuum. Anyone who owns, or
hopes to own, residential property is affected at least indirectly by the
regulations discussed in this Comment. The author's goal is not to
diminish the significant interests of Florida's residential property and
casualty insurance consumers, but rather to present a countervailing
argument that Florida's recent insurance regulations unduly infringe
upon the constitutional rights of insurers, and in truth benefit a dis-
crete, identifiable class of homeowners at the expense of the rest of
the residential insurance consumers throughout the state. Indeed, a
close analysis of the legislation arising out of Hurricane Andrew re-
veals that insurers operating in Florida are being compelled by the
state to subject their property and resources to an enormous risk of
loss for the benefit of a discrete, identifiable class. The Legislature
and the DOI have ignored or sacrificed insurers' constitutional rights
in their quest to reestablish and maintain an orderly and affordable
insurance market for property and casualty insurance in Florida.
This Comment will discuss the social and legal implications of Flor-
ida's Moratorium Law and subsequent legislation, as they affect both
the citizens of the state (as the purported beneficiaries of the morato-
rium) and the insurers who must conduct business under them. The
Comment will discuss recent developments in Florida concerning resi-
dential property and casualty insurance regulation after Hurricane
21. 4ER93-18, 19 Fla. Admin. Weekly 3079 (June 4, 1993). However, by virtue of section
120.54(9)(c), Florida Statutes, this rule, like all emergency rules, was valid for only 90 days.
22. The preamble to chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, provides as its justification that "the
enormous monetary impact to insurers of Hurricane Andrew claims has prompted insurers to
propose substantial cancellation or nonrenewal of their homeowner's [policies]."
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Andrew, and will analyze constitutional objections to these develop-
ments. The Comment will conclude that much of Florida's recent
property and casualty insurance regulation borders on, and in many
respects surpasses, the permissible level of constitutional infringe-
ment, and will recommend ways in which the state's insurance regula-
tors can protect the public welfare without unduly infringing upon the
constitutional rights of insurers.
II. THE MORATORIUM LAW AND ITS PROGENY
The central component of Florida's barrage of insurance regulation
in response to Hurricane Andrew was the Moratorium Law.23 The
Moratorium Law contained an exception to the application of the
moratorium for insurers who could establish that its proposed cancel-
lations or nonrenewals were necessary for the insurer to avoid an un-
reasonable risk of insolvency.24 However, the DOI interpreted this
exception narrowly, and in effect took the position that chapter 93-
401 banned any cancellation or nonrenewal of homeowner's policies."5
23. Chapter 93-401, Laws of Florida, provides in relevant part:
(3) MORATORIUM IMPOSED. - Effective May 19, 1993, no insurer authorized to
transact insurance in this state shall, until the expiration of this section pursuant to
subsection (6), cancel or nonrenew any personal lines property insurance policy in this
state, or issue any notice of cancellation or nonrenewal, on the basis of risk of hurri-
cane claims. All cancellations or nonrenewals must be substantiated by underwriting
rules filed with and accepted for use by the Department of Insurance, unless inconsis-
tent with the provisions of this section. The Department of Insurance is hereby
granted all necessary power to carry out the provisions of this section.
(5) PENALTY. - Any violation of this section constitutes a violation of the Insur-
ance Code. Each cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy in violation of this section
shall be considered a separate action.
(6) REPEAL. - This section is repealed on November 14, 1993.
24. This section shall not apply if the insurer can affirmatively demonstrate to the ...
IDOl] that the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal is necessary for the insurer to
avoid an unreasonable risk of insolvency. In reaching this determination the ...
(DOI] shall consider the insurer's size, its market concentration, its general financial
condition, the degree to which personal lines residential property insurance comprises
its insurance business in this state, and the way in which these factors impact on the
risk to the insurer's solvency in relation to its probable maximum loss in the event of a
hurricane. In no event shall any insurer be required to risk more than its total surplus
to any objectively defined probable maximum loss resulting from one Florida hurri-
cane loss event. In the event that the... [DOI] determines that the moratorium does
not apply in whole or in part and the... [DOI] further determines that the exception
affects more than 1 percent of any class of business within the personal lines residen-
tial property insurance market in this state, the . .. [DOI] shall in order set forth a
nonrenewal, cancellation, or withdrawal schedule that avoids unnecessary market dis-
ruption or exposure to the insured statewide or in any locale.
Ch. 93-401, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881 (emphasis added).
25. One insurer, Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. of Indiana (PRUPAC) re-
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Realizing that the Moratorium Law was merely a Band-Aid for the
extensive wounds inflicted by Hurricane Andrew, the Legislature took
further steps to protect the state's beleaguered homeowner's insurance
market-steps which this Comment refers to as the Moratorium
Law's "progeny." ' 26 In November 1993, when the initial moratorium
was scheduled to expire, the Legislature met in a special session and
approved a three year extension and subsequent phaseout of the mor-
atorium.2 7 Section 627.7013, Florida Statutes (Phaseout Statute),
which was simultaneously created and amended by chapters 93-410
and 93-411, Laws of Florida, places a restriction upon the number of
homeowner's policies an insurer may cancel or nonrenew annually for
the purpose of reducing the insurer's risk of loss from hurricane expo-
sure. 8 However, section 627.7013 provides that the statute does not
prohibit any cancellation or nonrenewal of homeowner's policies for
"any lawful reason unrelated to the risk of loss from hurricane expo-
sure. "29 Although the Phaseout Statute appears on its face to provide
some limited relief from the Moratorium Law for insurers seeking to
reduce their exposure in South Florida, the DOI has interpreted the
statute in such a liberal manner that virtually any reason given by an
insurer for canceling or nonrenewing a particular homeowner's policy
quested an exemption under the Moratorium Law which was denied by the DOI. See Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Department of Ins., 626 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Hav-
ing gone bankrupt twice by Hurricane Andrew, PRUPAC offered two computer simulations
which estimated its probable maximum losses from a single hurricane event at approximately
$1.5 billion (far in excess of its available surplus) if PRUPAC was prevented under the Morato-
rium Law from reducing its exposure. Id. at 995. Regardless, the DOI rejected its request for an
exemption, and PRUPAC sought an expedited hearing in the First District Court of Appeal, as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court challenging the constitutionality
of the Moratorium Law. Id. at 996-97. Although PRUPAC lost its action for injunctive relief
and never had the opportunity to reach the merits of its constitutional challenge to the Morato-
rium Law, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the DOI's denial of a partial exemption to
PRUPAC. Id. at 1000-10.
26. The use of the term "progeny" in this Comment is distinguishable from its use in the
context of judicial case law, in which it refers to a line of decisions evolving from a single prece-
dential case. However, the term as used in this Comment fairly characterizes the regulations
which were promulgated subsequent to the Moratorium Law. These regulations were in essence
extensions of, or complements to, the Moratorium Law and its basic objectives.
27. Ch. 93-410, 1993 Fla. Laws 7; ch. 93-411, 1993 Fla. Laws. 46.
28. FLA. STAT. § 627.7013 (1993). The Phaseout Statute provides that in any 12-month pe-
riod, an insurer may not cancel or nonrenew more than five percent of its homeowner's policies,
mobile home owner's policies, or personal lines residential policies within the state, or more than
ten percent of its homeowner's polices, mobile home owner's policies, or personal lines residen-
tial policies within a given county, to reduce the insurer's exposure to hurricane claims. Id. In-
surers seeking to exceed these limits on cancellations or nonrenewals within a given year must file
a phaseout plan with the DOI and obtain the DOI's approval before implementing such a plan.
Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.7013 (1993) (emphasis added).
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can be deemed related to the risk of hurricane loss.30 Most signifi-
cantly, the DOI also has construed the Phaseout Statute as supersed-
ing an insurer's right to surrender its certificate of authority and
withdraw its business from the state's residential property insurance
market pursuant to section 624.430, Florida Statutes (Withdrawal
Statute)." The Withdrawal Statute authorizes insurers to surrender
their certificates of authority and withdraw from the state or from a
specific line of insurance upon proper notice.3 2 Until enactment of the
Phaseout Statute, and arguably even after its enactment, an insurer's
right to seek cancellations and nonrenewals in connection with formal
withdrawal was basically untouched by the Moratorium Law.3 Yet,
the DOI's interpretation of the Phaseout Statute effectively subjects
all cancellations and nonrenewals, even those connected with an insur-
er's formal withdrawal from the market, to the restrictions set forth in
the Phaseout Statute, and thus places an insurer's fundamental right
to cease conducting business in the state at the mercy of the DOI.
30. In Proposed Rules 4-141.020(9)(a) and 4-141.021(3)(a)(3), the DOI asserts that the stat-
utory word "unrelated" must be construed in a "liberal, wide-reaching" manner. Consequently,
to be exempted from the Phaseout Statute's moratorium limits, a nonrenewal of a residential
policy "must be completely unrelated, directly and indirectly, to reduction of risk of loss from
hurricane exposure." 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531 (Feb. 4, 1994) (emphasis added).
31. See 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531, 534 (Feb. 4, 1994). A critical distinction must be made
between an insurer who wishes to retain its certificate of authority and continue doing business
in a given insurance market, but at a lesser volume via cancellations and nonrenewals, and an
in'surer who surrenders its license under section 624.430, Florida Statutes, and withdraws from a
specific market entirely by canceling or nonrenewing policies. Section 624.430, Florida Statutes,
authorizes insurers to surrender their certificates of authority and withdraw from a specific line
of insurance upon giving the DOI proper notice. The Moratorium Law, on its face, only applied
to insurers who choose to remain in the residential property insurance market and did not affect
an insurer's right to cancel or nonrenew such policies in connection with its formal withdrawal
from the market, regardless of whether that withdrawal and resulting cancellations or nonrene-
wals were related to the risk of hurricane loss. See ch. 93-401, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881. The Phase-
out Statute, as amended by chapter 93-411, Laws of Florida, contains the Legislature's first
reference to the Withdrawal Statute: "[n]otwithstanding any provisions of this section to the
contrary, this section does not apply to any insurer who, before August 24, 1992, filed notice of
its intent to discontinue its writings in this state under s. 624.430." Ch. 93-411, 1993 Fla. Laws
46. The DOI, however, has by negative inference interpreted this language as an attempt by the
Legislature to preempt the Withdrawal Statute with the Phaseout Statute, thereby prohibiting
withdrawing insurers from canceling or nonrenewing homeowner's policies for reasons related to
the risk of hurricane loss if the insurers' notice of withdrawal was filed after August 24, 1992.
See 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531, 534 (Feb. 4, 1994). In addition to a number of objections based
on the fundamental rules of statutory construction, this blanket restriction upon an insurer's
statutory right to cease doing business and withdraw its assets raises substantial constitutional
objections. See infra, Part III. Not surprisingly, these rules have been challenged in a section
120.54, Florida Statutes, proceeding by several insurers, and, in fact a hearing officer from the
Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) issued a final order on April 7, 1995 finding that a
majority of DOI's proposed rule 4-141.020 constituted an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority and was arbitrary and capricious. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Ins., No. 94-1003-RP (Final Order, Apr. 7, 1995, Div. of Admin. Hearings).
32. FLA. STAT. § 624.430 (1993).
33. See ch. 93-401, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881.
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Finally, after much debate and discussion between Florida's prop-
erty and casualty insurers and the state regulators, the Legislature cre-
ated section 215.555, Florida Statutes, which provided for the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Trust Fund.A4 Section 215.555 imposes a man-
datory assessment upon all insurers to capitalize the fund, which theo-
retically will act as a buffer for hurricane catastrophes which inflict
damages in excess of the insurers' collective ability to pay.35 Once
again, the law at first glance appears to aid insurers by creating a state
mandated "reinsurance fund," thereby reducing the insolvency risks
that insurers have emphasized in seeking cancellations or nonrene-
wals.16 However, when one considers that each insurer is required to
pay millions of dollars as an annual assessment (depending on the size
of the insurer)," necessarily leading to increased rates for consumers,
it becomes apparent that section 215.555 is simply another consumer
protection mechanism implemented by the Legislature at an increased
cost to insurance companies and consumers alike. 38 While the addi-
tional cost will affect insurers and consumers statewide, the fund4 col-
lected will theoretically be used primarily for the benefit of a minority
of homeowners in high-risk areas of the state. Moreover, while the
DOI's interpretation and application of the Phaseout Statute denies
property and casualty insurers their statutory right to cease doing
business in Florida-effectively chaining them to the state-the Legis-
lature now imposes even more assessments and taxes upon the captive
insurers by requiring them to capitalize the Florida Hurricane Catas-
trophe Trust Fund. The constitutional validity of such a regulatory
scheme is suspect at best.3 9
34. Ch. 93-409, 1993 Fla. Laws 1. The newly created section 215.555(4)(b), Florida Sta-
tutes, requires the fund to "reimburse the insurer for 75 percent of their losses from covered
losses in excess of two times the insurer's gross direct written premium from covered policies."
This state-mandated and state-owned insurance fund is the first of its kind in the United States.
35. Id. A number of insurers have challenged the constitutionality of section 215.555, as
well as the manner in which the fund is operated and the formula, or lack thereof, used in
determining the amount of the assessment each insurer is required to pay under the fund. See
Service Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Admin., No. 94-3630 (filed July 29, 1994, Cir. Ct. in Leon
County).
36. Ch. 93-409, 1993 Fla. Laws 1.
37. The assessments for this state-owned and state-mandated reinsurance fund are in addi-
tion to the individual reinsurance policies carried by all property and casualty insurers and the
substantial premiums paid by insurers under those policies.
38. Former Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher revealed this exact point when he
noted that "this catastrophe fund gave the [L]egislature the opportunity to get some great con-
sumer protections in the law." David Satterfield, South Florida Insurance Still in Crisis, MIAM
HERALD, Nov. 13, 1993, at Al.
39. In fact, a pending lawsuit has challenged this regulatory scheme on a number of the
grounds discussed in this Comment. See Vesta Fire Ins. Co. v. State of Fla., No. 94-1311 (filed
June 30, 1994, S.D. Fla.).
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In sum, the recent flood of new insurance regulation in response to
Hurricane Andrew has reshaped the landscape of residential property
and casualty insurance in Florida. The state's far-reaching insurance
regulations have manipulated the critical supply and demand mechan-
isms of the property and casualty insurance market. They have done
so in a manner which violates the constitutional rights of the insurers
and which places the financial stability and solvency of insurers (and
consequently the financial stability and solvency of their policyhold-
ers) in a precarious position that depends entirely upon the unpredict-
able and unforgiving forces of nature.
III. INSURANCE ON DEMAND: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FLORIDA'S POST-ANDREW INSURANCE REGULATION
The business of insurance strongly affects the public interest and is
therefore "subject to comprehensive regulation in protecting the pub-
lic welfare." 4 Insurance in its many forms has played an integral role
in the development of our country and provides elements of stability
and security which are necessary to some degree in any market-ori-
ented society. 4' The modern business world could not have thrived and
prospered as it has in the past century without a significant insurance
industry. Much like tort law, insurance acts as a mechanism for re-
solving disputes and providing necessary remedies so that individuals
are not faced with devastating loss as a result of life's frequent misfor-
tunes. In light of its particular status in our society, the insurance in-
dustry is arguably one of the most complex in the world.42 Given the
pervasive impact that insurance has on our society, it is clear that both
the federal and state governments have a compelling interest in ensur-
ing the existence of an orderly market for health, life, professional
liability, property and casualty, and other types of insurance. Recog-
nizing that the complex nature of insurance lends itself to the more
individualized and flexible method of regulation found at the state
level, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,'4 which
40. Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 625, 631 (N.J. 1979).
41. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MorN. L. REv. 471, 480 (1961).
42. JOHN G. DAY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES iii (1970) ("[Flew fields match in complexity that of the regulation of
insurance.").
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988). The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part,
that "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988). Although a detailed discussion of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act is beyond the scope of this Comment, suffice it to say that the intended meaning
of the words "business of insurance" contained in the Act has been a fertile source of litigation
and scholarly comment since its enactment. See, e.g., David G. Stebing, Insurance Regulation in
Alaska: Healthy Exercise of a State Prerogative, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 284 (1993).
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formally recognized state power to regulate insurance and exempted
insurers from certain provisions of the federal antitrust laws. 4 As a
result, the vast majority of insurance regulation has been enacted at
the state level because of state interests in protecting consumers from
perceived predatory practices by insurers and in ensuring consumer
access to affordable insurance.4 5 Indeed, the insurance industry has
evolved into one of the most highly regulated industries in the coun-
try.46
In light of the above, the right to conduct the business of insurance
is arguably a privilege granted by the state, and an insurer therefore
submits itself to the regulatory power of the state and agrees to con-
duct its business in the manner prescribed by state law . 47 However,
while the right to engage in the business of insurance has traditionally
been (and will likely continue to be) viewed as a privilege bestowed by
the state, there is growing sentiment in almost every state that a citi-
zen's access to various forms of insurance is no longer to be deemed a
benefit or privilege, but rather an entitlement. 4 Consumers and regu-
lators alike have increasingly looked to insurers to provide these enti-
tlements, regardless of the cost or risk of doing so. This particularly
has been true in the area of automobile insurance49 and, as this Com-
ment will discuss, most recently in the realm of residential property
insurance. The state's right to intensely regulate the business of insur-
ance does not, however, afford a state free reign to arbitrarily impose
unduly burdensome or confiscatory requirements upon its insurers.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-1014 (1988).
45. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Insurance
is, of course, an industry traditionally highly regulated by the state."). For example, California
passed Proposition 103 in November 1988 in an attempt to fundamentally alter the state's insur-
ance industry. See Calfartn Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989). In its statement
of findings and purpose, Proposition 103 declared that "[e]normous increases in the cost of
insurance have made it both unaffordable and unavailable-to millions of Californians," and that
"existing laws inadequately protect[ed] consumers and allow[ed] insurance companies to charge
excessive, unjustified and arbitrary rates." Id. at 1250 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West
1992)).
46. Stebing, supra note 43, at 284-85.
47. See, e.g., People exrel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978).
48. The recent debate over health care reform provides an excellent example. In fact, Presi-
dent Clinton's demand for universal coverage is somewhat analogous to the moratorium on can-
celing or nonrenewing residential property and casualty insurance in that it is seemingly made
without regard to the tremendous costs it imposes upon the private sector, and in particular
upon the millions of Americans who already have quality health care plans. Under such a
scheme of regulation, the supply and demand mechanisms of the insurance industry-and of our
market economy in general-give way to socialist principles and ideals.
49. See Stebing, supra note 43. In Florida, as in most other states, financial responsibility
for motor vehicle liability is mandated by law.
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Indeed, the regulations which are the focus of this Comment-the
Moratorium Law and its progeny-give rise to a number of constitu-
tional objections. Several of these objections have significant force,
such as arguments that the Moratorium Law and its progeny violate
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution,0 the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution,5 the Impairment of Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution,5 2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." This Comment will
briefly consider each of these constitutional arguments in turn.
A. "Going Too Far": The Moratorium Law Takes Without Just
Compensation and Without Due Process
The Moratorium Law and its recent progeny constitute an imper-
missible regulatory taking by the state without just compensation and
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection of prop-
erty.54 The United States Supreme Court and numerous other courts
repeatedly have determined that assets and capital fall within the con-
cept of "property" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.55 Although the state may
reasonably regulate private property (such as an insurer's capital and
assets) for the benefit of the public health, safety or welfare without
infringing upon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, such regula-
50. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Similarly, article X,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken except
for a public purpose and with full compensation."
51. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution sets forth an identical guarantee.
52. Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall
... pass any. .. Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Article I, section 10 of the Flor-
ida Constitution likewise provides that "[n]o ... law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed."
53. Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
-[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
54. It is well settled that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus enjoy the protections of the Due Process Clause. E.g., Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
55. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (finding even intangi-
ble rights in trade secrets to be protected property); Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Ass'n v. Paradis, 756 F. Supp. 669, 675-76 (D.R.I. 1991) (finding that insurers' capital and
interest thereon are protected property).
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tion may not rise to a level which unduly deprives property owners of
the fundamental use, benefit, and control of their property without
providing just compensation in return. 6 However, this is arguably the
intent and effect of the Moratorium Law and its progeny. Indeed,
these laws and regulations: (1) unconstitutionally infringe upon the le-
gitimate investment-backed expectations of the insurers; (2) place an
embargo upon insurers' capital and assets, thereby usurping the insur-
ers' fundamental rights to control their property and exclude others
from the benefit of that property; and (3) lack a proper public pur-
pose in that they primarily benefit a discrete and identifiable class
rather than the general public.
The power of the state to regulate insurance companies is not abso-
lute, as an insurer is still entitled to due process of law. 7 An insurer's
right to due process entails two important concepts. First, the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 prohibits the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. 9 The taking need
not be direct or de jure, but may be de facto in that it results from "a
regulatory scheme so onerous and burdensome as to substantially di-
minish the value of the property.., or convert the property to a pub-
lic use by denying the owner of private control." 6 Second, the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of property without due process of law.6' Again, the deprivation need
not be direct, but may consist of regulations or legislation which arbi-
trarily, unreasonably, and without sufficient public purpose deprive
the owner of the benefits of his property.62 The Moratorium Law and
its progeny arguably run afoul of both of these constitutional princi-
ples.
1. Defeating Legitimate Investment-Backed Expectations
As early as 1922, the Supreme Court recognized that state regula-
tion which "goes too far" in affecting an owner's property interests
may be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment .6  The Court
56. See, e.g., People ex rel. Lewis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978).
57. E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
58. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (citing Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1887)).
59. People ex rel. Lewis, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
60. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. People ex rel. Lewis, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
63. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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subsequently developed this analysis in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,6 in which Justice Brennan crafted the mod-
ern standard for determining whether a governmental regulation rises
to the level of a taking which must be compensated under the Fifth
Amendment. 6' The Court in Penn Central held that if the regulation
in question: (1) involves a legitimate state interest; which is, (2) rea-
sonably advanced by the chosen means; and (3) does not result in a
total diminution of value in the property (e.g., does not "go too
far"), then there is no unconstitutional taking without just compensa-
tion.e However, the rather permissive, pro-government test set forth
in Penn Central has been significantly constricted by the Supreme
Court in several recent decisions, most notably in opinions by Justice
Scalia. 67
A significant element of the Court's regulatory taking analysis is the
effect a regulation has on the property owner's "distinct investment-
backed expectations." 68 The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a
regulatory measure which effectively destroys investment-backed ex-
pectations constitutes a taking requiring just compensation. 69 For ex-
ample, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,70 a pesticide manufacturer
challenged certain data-disclosure provisions of the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 7' The manufacturer asserted that
those provisions constituted a taking of its trade secrets by allowing
the disclosure of its pesticide's components. 72 In assessing the manu-
facturer's investment-backed expectations, the Court found that the
manufacturer had submitted information to the government concern-
ing its products under the legitimate expectation of confidentiality for
a period of approximately six years. 7' In light of the established pat-
tern of confidentiality and cooperation that existed between the manu-
facturer and the government, the Court concluded that the disclosure
64. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
65. Id. at 127.
66. Id.
67. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring a tighter
nexus between the governmental interest of conferring a public good and the regulation restrict-
ing use of private property); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)
(finding the state's proffered public purpose Adid not justify eliminating the owner's distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations, and that the state's prohibitions on land use must instead be
based upon common law nuisance which existed at the time the owner purchased the property).
68. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
69. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see also Medical Malpractice
Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Paradis, 756 F. Supp. 669 (D.R.I. 1991).
70. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994).
72. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998.
73. Id. at 1011.
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of the contents of those submissions was a taking of the manufactur-
er's property which required compensation.14
A similar result was reached in Medical Malpractice Joint Under-
writing Ass'n v. Paradis," where members of an insurance joint un-
derwriting association (JUA) were required to pay capital to fund
operation of the JUA in the event of a deficit. At the time the insurers
made these contributions, state law directed that the JUA's premium
rates were to be set on an actuarially sound basis to assure a reasona-
ble rate of return.7 6 However, the state subsequently froze the JUA's
rates at levels which were inadequate to cover claims and repay the
member insurers' assessments. The member insurers brought suit al-
leging that the rate freeze constituted an unconstitutional taking of
their property. 7 The Paradis court agreed, finding that the rate freeze
unreasonably interfered with the JUA members' investment-backed
expectations concerning both the return of their capital and a reasona-
ble return of profit on that capital. 78 The court held that because no
assurance was made for a fair, reasonable, and adequate compensa-
tion, the taking was unconstitutional. 79
The Moratorium Law and its progeny have an even more egregious
effect on property insurers' legitimate investment-backed expectations
than did the laws invalidated in Ruckelshaus and Paradis. Before the
enactment of the Moratorium Law and the Phaseout Statute, insurers
diverted their capital to the Florida residential property market, where
policies were issued based upon the insurers' clear entitlement to non-
renew those policies if the risk exposure became unacceptable, or al-
ternatively, to withdraw from the market if need be. This was the
indisputable status of the law pursuant to section 627.4133, Florida
Statutes,8s and section 624.430, Florida Statutes."' Insurers reasonably
expected that these laws would apply to their investments within the
74. Id. at 1013.
75. 756 F. Supp. 669 (D.R.I. 1991).
76. Id. at 672.
77. Id. at 673.
78. Id. at 676.
79. Id. at 677.
80. Section 627.4133, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:
(1) An insurer issuing a policy providing coverage for property ... shall give the
named insured at least 45 days' advance written notice of nonrenewal or of the re-
newal premium. If the policy is not to be renewed, the written notice shall state the
reason or reasons as to why the policy is not to be renewed ....
(2) An insurer issuing a policy providing coverage for property, casualty . . . shall give
the named insured written notice of cancellation or termination other than nonrenewal
at least 45 days prior to the effective date of the cancellation or termination, including
in the written notice the reason or reasons for the cancellation or termination. ...
81. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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state. Thus, insurers expected their investment (and its corresponding
risk) to be time-limited according to the terms of their policies, and
they entered the market under the express assumption that they could
withdraw from it upon compliance with certain statutory require-
ments.8 2 The fact that these investment-backed expectations are not
only legitimate, but also critical, is best demonstrated by Hurricane
Andrew itself. Post-Andrew studies assessing the risk of catastrophic
loss in light of new information gained as a result of Hurricane An-
drew demonstrate that the reallocation of capital by insurers is abso-
lutely necessary to assure both their continued solvency and a
profitable return.83 However, at a time when insurers most need the
freedom to exercise these fundamental rights, the legislature has effec-
tively abrogated those rights by enacting the Moratorium Law and its
progeny.
By abolishing property insurers' contractual and statutory rights to
nonrenew policies or withdraw from the market, thereby preventing
reallocation and efficient management of capital, the Moratorium
Law and the Phaseout Statute have destroyed the distinct investment-
backed expectations upon which insurers reasonably relied when ini-
tially making their investments. Insurers have in effect been compelled
to surrender control over the use of a significant portion of their capi-
tal, and with it, the expectation of being able to reallocate that capital
upon the expiration of the policies. Most significantly, the Morato-
rium Law and the Phaseout Statute prohibit insurers from allocating
their capital resources to avoid the risk of catastrophic loss and result-
ing insolvency. In light of such a regulatory scheme, the destructive
effect which the Moratorium Law and its progeny have upon the in-
vestment-backed expectations of the state's property insurers is readily
apparent.
2. Confiscating the Golden Twig: The Right to Control Property
and Exclude Others from its Use
The Moratorium Law and its progeny also effect a taking by abro-
gating an insurer's right to control its capital resources and to exclude
others from the use and benefit of that property. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that "one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property
82. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.14 (1977); Weldon
v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (Existing law is incorporated into a
contract; thus, when issuing policies, insurers expected the existing law to apply to those policies
in the future.).
83. See Satterfield, supra note 12.
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... [is] the right to exclude others." On numerous occasions, the
Supreme Court has held that the denial of this fundamental property
right amounts to a taking which must be compensated." For example,
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,16 the Court emphasized that the
"right to exclude, so universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Gov-
ernment cannot take without compensation." 8 7 In Kaiser Aetna, the
petitioners opened a privately owned and formerly landlocked pond to
the waters of the United States, thereby making the pond "navigable
waters" subject to Congress' regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause. The Supreme Court rejected the government's attempt
to impose a navigational servitude allowing public access to the pond,
and found that the imposition of such a navigational servitude, with-
out compensation, violated the Fifth Amendment. Although the
Court noted that the government had a strong interest in assuring ac-
cess to and use of navigable waters, and that the public intrusion at
issue was simply an access easement, 89 it nevertheless held that "the
Government's attempt to create a public right of access to the im-
proved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement
for navigation as to amount to a taking."' 9
A case more analogous to the subject matter of this Comment is
Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 91 in which the Court of Ap-
peals of New York struck down a New York City ordinance which
was intended to preserve low rent, or "single room occupancy" (SRO)
housing. Believing that SRO housing was rapidly being destroyed and
that there would be a shortage of housing for the poor and homeless,
the city enacted ordinances which imposed a moratorium on the alter-
ation or demolition of all SRO housing and required SRO housing
owners to rehabilitate all of their units and rent them to tenants. 92 The
ordinances further provided for a "buy-out" provision allowing SRO
owners to purchase an exemption from the moratorium for $45,000
per unit, and for penalties to be imposed for non-compliance with the
84. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
85. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716. See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979);
Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
86. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
87. Id. at 179-80.
88. Id. at 176-80.
89. Id. at 178.
90. Id.
91. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
92. Id. at 1060.
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moratorium. 93 Recognizing that "the most important of the various
rights of an owner is the right of possession," ' the court stated that:
The question here, as in any case where government action is
challenged as violative of the right to just compensation, is whether
the uncompensated obligations and restrictions imposed by the
governmental action forces individual property owners to bear more
than a just share of obligations which are rightfully those of society
at large. 95
The court held that because the SRO housing ordinance effectively
required owners to rent their properties to individual strangers, it
drastically interfered with the property owners' rights to possess and
exclude, thus constituting a physical taking under both the federal and
New York Constitutions.9 The court in Seawall Associates also struck
the New York SRO ordinance as a regulatory taking based on the
same analysis employed in Kaiser Aetna,97 finding that "[e]ven if [the
SRO ordinance] were not held to effect a physical taking, it would still
be facially invalid as a regulatory taking.''98 Thus, even though the
SRO ordinance in Seawall Associates destroyed only one stick in the
owner's bundle of property rights-the right to possess and use the
property-the court found a sufficiently severe deprivation of "eco-
nomically viable use" to also strike the ordinance as a regulatory tak-
ing.9 The court in Seawall Associates concluded that "[tihe rights to
use and to possess have been abolished and, without regard to the
value of the owners' remaining interests in their buildings, that would
be sufficient [to constitute a taking]." 1°
The Moratorium Law and its progeny are functionally equivalent to
the New York SRO ordinance invalidated in Seawall Associates. The
Moratorium Law and the DOI's construction of the Phaseout Statute
completely deprive Florida's property insurers of the right to exert
control over their property. Because insurers are not free to exclude
potential policyholders from coverage, the Moratorium Law prohibits
insurers from using and allocating their property according to market
forces. Indeed, the Moratorium Law and its progeny not only deprive
93. Id. at 1062.
94. Id. at 1063.
95. Id. at 1062.
96. Id. at 1069.
97. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
98. Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 976 (1989).
99. Id. at 1066.
100. Id. at 1067-68.
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insurers of the use and control of their property, but they do so to a
degree which places an insurer's solvency at risk. In short, the Mora-
torium Law, much like the ordinance invalidated in Seawall Associ-
ates, compels an insurer, against its will, to surrender its capital
resources for the pre-determined use of a discrete and identifiable
class of private beneficiaries.
The United States Supreme Court recently warned that laws effect-
ing such an unapproved surrender of property constitute a taking.10'
In Yee v. City of Escondido, a California mobile home park owner
challenged a rent control ordinance on the basis that, when combined
with the mandates of state regulations on mobile home parks, the or-
dinance constituted an uncompensated taking.' °2 The Supreme Court
held that the ordinance did not result in a taking because the park
owners had voluntarily offered their property to the tenants, and
could cease offering the use of its property upon proper notice. In so
holding, the Court noted that:
[A]t least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the City nor
the State compels petitioners, once they have rented their property to
tenants, to continue doing so. To the contrary, the Mobilehome
Residency Law provides that a park owner who wishes to change the
use of his land may evict his tenants. 03
Although the Court in Yee rejected the physical takings claim, it ac-
knowledged that the challenged laws could fall "within the scope of
our regulatory taking cases," and opined that, "a different case
would be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to com-
pel a landowner to rent his property or to refrain in perpetuity from
terminating a tenancy." 14
The Moratorium Law and its progeny present the equivalent of that
hypothetical case. The regulations compel insurers to renew all out-
standing policies, thereby subjecting their capital resources to the risk
of continued loss against their will for the benefit of individual policy-
holders. As the Supreme Court in Yee implicitly forewarned, the mere
fact that an insurer once volunteered its capital by entering the resi-
dential property insurance market does not entitle the state to place an
embargo upon that capital for the benefit of private parties. 05 Yet,
the Moratorium Law and its progeny have this effect. Indeed, the in-
101. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
102. Id. at 1526.
103. Id. at 1528.
104. Id. at 1529.
105. See id.
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vidious nature of these confiscatory laws is best illustrated by the
DOI's present interpretation of the Phaseout Statute as a superseding
barrier to an insurer's statutory right of withdrawal.'1 6 Adding insult
to injury, the Legislature now imposes Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
assessments upon these captive insurers as "a condition of doing busi-
ness in this state,"10' thereby exacting an even greater regulatory tak-
ing without compensation.
However, at least one court has expressly rejected such an attempt
by a state regulator to compel an insurer to continue doing business
against its will. In People ex rel. Lewis v. Safeco Insurance Co. of
America,108 the New York insurance superintendent prohibited several
insurers from surrendering their licenses and withdrawing from the
state's automobile insurance market. The superintendent asserted that
the companies' withdrawal and resulting nonrenewals would violate
the state's mandatory renewal law. 1°9 The court found that this inter-
pretation compelled the insurers to do business in the state in violation
of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and ex-
pressly held that:
Absent the most severe and grave public emergency, the State may
not compel a corporation to conduct a business against its choosing.
Even in the highly regulated business of insurance, the insurer must
retain some choice as to how it will conduct its business. When the
state controls the terms of the coverage, while denying the right to
terminate or raise premiums, that choice becomes illusory ....
[Tihe fact that the defendants once submitted to government control,
by applying for licenses which gave them the privilege of engaging in
the insurance business in this State, does not mean that they must
forever be in bondage, subject to such control."10
The Moratorium Law and its progeny similarly render an insurer's
property interests illusory, in that they abrogate an insurer's funda-
mental right to cease doing business in the state and then impose new
assessments against the captive insurer as a "condition" of doing
business in the state. In sum, the regulatory scheme implemented by
the Moratorium Law and its progeny abolishes an insurer's invest-
ment-backed expectations and infringes upon its ability to use and
control its capital to such a degree as to clearly constitute an uncom-
pensated taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
106. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
107. Ch. 93-409, § 4(a), 1993 Fla. Laws 3.
108. 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 830 (citations omitted).
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3. The Moratorium Law Has No Public Purpose Justifying its
Confiscatory Effects
A party who suffers even a "temporary taking" is entitled to just
compensation for damages incurred as a result of the seizure."' If the
state pays just compensation, it has the authority to condemn private
property and permit its use by others, provided that the taking fur-
thers an overriding public purpose."12 The requirement that the taking
predominately serve a "public purpose" is the sine qua non of the
constitutional exercise of this "harsh" sovereign power." 3
The taking effected by the Moratorium Law and its progeny fails to
meet this constitutional mandate, in that the laws make no provision
for the just compensation of insurers, and are predominately for pri-
vate, rather than public, benefit. The avowed purpose of the Morato-
rium Law is to maintain "an orderly market for property insurance"
and to assure availability of coverage to Florida residents. '1 In reality,
however, the Moratorium Law forces insurers to surrender their rights
to manage, invest, and reallocate their capital and surplus for the ben-
efit of a discrete, identifable, and closed group of individuals-their
current policyholders. Furthermore, the taking of an insurer's prop-
erty is not confined to the benefit of only those policyholders who
would have had their coverage canceled or who are unable to find
replacement coverage. Rather, the Moratorium Law presses an insur-
er's capital into the service of all of its existing policyholders, thereby
benefiting a specific group of individuals regardless of whether they
are truly in danger of losing their residential property insurance
through cancellation or nonrenewal. Thus, the Moratorium Law not
only guarantees policyholders the entitlement of having residential
property insurance, but it also gives them the right to receive that in-
surance from the insurer of their choice-their present carriers-for a
pre-established rate and time period.
The fact that the Moratorium Law fails to implement a valid public
purpose is further evidenced by the existence of another mechanism
which accomplishes the same objective as that of the Moratorium
Law. Pursuant to chapter 92-345, Laws of Florida, the Legislature has
provided for residential property insurance to all Florid& homeowners
111. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987). As with permanent takings, temporary takings are constitutionally prohib-
ited unless the seizure is both compensated and for a public purpose. Id.
112. See Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1975).
113. Seeid.
114. Ch. 93-401 § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881.
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unable to secure coverage in the voluntary market. The law created
the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association
(Residential JUA), which is comprised of almost all of the insurers
licensed to transact residential insurance in the state." 5 Through the
Residential JUA, the state's regulators already compel the vast major-
ity of insurers to write policies to high risk homeowners and thereby
bear a proportionate share of the heightened risks and increased costs
of those policies as a condition of doing business in Florida's residen-
tial property insurance market.
The existence of chapter 92-345, Laws of Florida, demonstrates that
the Moratorium Law does not adequately rest upon the public pur-
pose of providing all Florida residents with property insurance cover-
age, as the state is already fulfilling this avowed public need, albeit in
a rather haphazard manner (as discussed infra, at Part IV). Indeed,
the Moratorium Law and its progeny fail to provide a benefit to any
Floridian who was uninsured before their enactment. In short, legisla-
tion which seeks to provide an entitlement to a discrete, identifiable
class of private citizens at the sole expense of another discrete class of
private entities lacks the public purpose necessary to support an un-
compensated taking. The Moratorium Law and its progeny fall within
this category of legislation.
In essence, the Moratorium Law and its progeny clearly fail to meet
any of the criteria of a valid taking. The Law absolutely defeats the
insurers' investment-backed expectations and effectively prohibits
them from exercising their right to control and manage their capital
resources efficiently and prudently. Moreover, the Moratorium Law is
designed to benefit a discrete and identifiable class of individuals, and
thus requires insurers to continually subject their capital and assets to
the risk of catastrophic loss for the benefit of a discrete few. As such,
the Moratorium Law and its progeny constitute an impermissible reg-
115. Ch. 92-345 § 6, 1993 Fla. Laws 1. The JUA law provides in relevant part:
(a)There is created a joint underwriting association for equitable apportionment or
sharing among insurers of property and casualty insurance covering residential prop-
erty, for applicants who are in good faith entitled, but are unable, to procure insur-
ance through the admitted voluntary market....
(b) All insurers authorized to write such insurance in this state must participate in and
be members of the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association.
Each member's portion of losses and expenses incurred must be in the proportion that
the direct premiums of the member written on residential property in this state during
the preceding calendar year bears to the aggregate direct premiums of all members of
the association written on residential property in this state during the preceding calen-
dar year.
The law provides for limited participation or a total exemption for the smallest of the state's
residential property insurers who lack the capital resources to take on even a minimal proportion
of the JUA's risk. Id.
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ulatory taking by the state without just compensation, and violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection of property.
B. Commandeering Contracts for Private Good: An
Unconstitutional Impairment of Contracts
The constitutional right to enter into contracts and receive the ex-
pected benefits from those contracts without undue interference from
the state is a central feature of our society." 6 Indeed, the United
States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ...pass any ...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. ' " 7 Acknowledging the
fundamental role which contractual rights play in our market econ-
omy, the Florida Constitution likewise prohibits the Legislature from
passing laws which impair the obligation of contracts."' As a general
rule under both state and federal law, the statutory rights and regula-
tions in force at the time a contract is made are incorporated into the
terms of the contract." 9 Thus, the law as it exists at the time the con-
tract is created controls the parties' rights in any subsequent dispute.
Before the enactment of the Moratorium Law and its progeny, in-
surers had a clear and indisputable right to cancel or nonrenew hom-
eowner's property insurance pursuant to section 627.4133, Florida
Statutes.120 This section provides that upon giving proper notice and
stating the grounds for cancellation or nonrenewal, an insurer can
cancel or nonrenew any policy, thereby reducing its risk in a given line
of insurance and enabling it to reallocate its capital resources to other
areas.' 21 This fundamental contractual right is, without question, the
most important right of insurers regarding their ability to manage
their capital resources. At its most basic level, the Moratorium Law
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
117. fd.
118. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 10. Although the language is almost identical in the Florida and
federal contracts clauses, the Supreme Court of Florida has expressed its intent not to allow as
much impairment under the Florida clause as would be allowed under the federal analysis. See,
e.g., Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, Inc., 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979).
119. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.14 (1977); Weldon v. All
Am. Life Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
120. Section 627.4133, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:
(1) An insurer issuing a policy providing coverage for property ... shall give the
named insured at least 45 days' advance written notice of nonrenewal or of the re-
newal premium. If the policy is not to be renewed, the written notice shall state the
reason or reasons as to why the policy is not to be renewed ....
(2) An insurer issuing a policy providing coverage for property, casualty.., shall give
the named insured written notice of cancellation or termination other than nonrenewal
at least 45 days prior to the effective date of the cancellation or termination, including
in the written notice the reason or reasons for the cancellation or termination ..
121. Id.
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retroactively imposes a new obligation upon insurers, one which re-
quires the insurer to remain in a contractual relationship for a period
beyond that agreed upon by the parties to the contract. In addition, it
subjects the insurer's resources to continued risk of loss, all for the
benefit of the policyholder. As such, the Moratorium Law impairs an
insurer's rights and obligations under its contracts, and fails to do so
in a constitutionally permissible manner.
The United States Supreme Court has formulated the following cri-
teria for determining whether a state law unconstitutionally impairs
contracts:
(1) Whether the state law operates as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship.
(2) If so, whether the state has a significant and legitimate public
purpose for the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and
general social or economic problem.
(3) If so, whether the adjustments of the rights and responsibilities of
contracting parties are based upon reasonable conditions and are of
a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
legislation's adoption. 22
The Supreme Court thus has adopted a rather subjective balancing
test to determine when an individual's contractual obligations have
been unconstitutionally impaired by the state.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has employed a similar analy-
sis interpreting the scope of Florida's Impairment of Contract Clause,
the court has stated on numerous occasions that it will not allow the
degree of impairment which the federal analysis permits. 23 Yet, as
demonstrated in the discussion infra, even under the Supreme Court's
more restrictive analysis, the Moratorium Law and its progeny act as
a substantial and irreparable impairment of an insurer's contractual
rights and obligations.
1. The Moratorium Law Impairs Contracts Among Insurers and
Policyholders
The Moratorium Law fails the first prong of the U.S. Supreme
Court's impairment analysis, as the moratorium fundamentally alters
122. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)
(citations omitted).
123. Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, 378 So. 2d 774, 780 (Fla. 1979); see
also Geary Distributing Co. v. All Brand Importers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing earlier Florida cases holding that "[v]irtually no degree of contract impairment has
been tolerated in [Florida]"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 971 (1992).
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the contracts between insurers and their policyholders. Under the
terms of a residential property insurance policy, an insurer subjects its
capital, for a specific premium and time period, and in an amount far
greater than the premium it receives, to the risk of loss upon certain
contingencies. In light of the complex nature of the insurance busi-
ness, insurers must choose which risks to insure, decide what types of
insurance to market, determine the proper premium to charge, man-
age and invest premium funds, share risks through reinsurance, estab-
lish adequate reserves, handle claims, and provide quality customer
service. 12An insurer makes these critical decisions based on its expec-
tation that any risk it assumes can be eliminated and its capital reallo-
cated upon expiration of the policy. This contractual right is even
more critical where recent catastrophes, such as Hurricane Andrew,
have altered an insurer's predictions concerning the level of risk to
which its resources are being subjected. The Moratorium Law's ex-
press terms prohibit insurers from exercising this fundamental right;
thus, the law acts as a substantial impairment of contracts.
This conclusion is supported by the decisions of the courts. For ex-
ample, in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n,' 25 the United States Su-
preme Court recognized that a contract is significantly impaired when
legislation abrogates contractual rights concerning the allocation of
capital. There, Louisiana law had previously required domestic build-
ing and loan associations to dedicate fifty percent of their receipts to-
ward the payment of withdrawing members' claims whenever the
association's proceeds were inadequate to pay the claims of those
members within sixty days.'2 In response to the tremendous pressures
of the Great Depression, the Louisiana Legislature passed a law pre-
scribing a different scheme which was less favorable to withdrawing
members.' 217 The Court held this was an unconstitutional impairment
of the withdrawing members' contractual rights. 2
Further support is found in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus,'29 where an employer challenged a Minnesota act requiring pri-
vate employers with 100 or more employees who chose to fund
124. Stebing, supra note 43, at 283.
125. 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
126. Id. at 191.
127. Id. at 191-92. Arguably, the stress placed upon Florida's property insurance market has
not had a greater adverse effect upon societal interests than that of the Great Depression, and
yet the Court in Treigle found this impairment impermissible even in light of the compelling
interests supporting the legislation at issue in that case.
128. Id. at 194.
129. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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pension plans to pay a "pension funding charge" to the state upon
either terminating the plan or closing a Minnesota office. In finding
that the legislation substantially impaired the employer's contractual
rights, the Supreme Court emphasized the law's effect upon the em-
ployer's prior contractual freedom to reallocate capital and risk:
Here, the company's contracts of employment with its employees
included as a fringe benefit or additional form of compensation, the
pension plan. The company's maximum obligation was to set aside
each year an amount based on the plan's requirements for vesting.
The plan satisfied the current federal income tax code and was
subject to no other legislative requirements. And, of course, the
company was free to amend or terminate the pension plan at any
time. The company thus had no reason to anticipate that its
employees' pension rights could become vested except in accordance
with the terms of the plan. It relied heavily, and reasonably, on this
legitimate contractual expectation in calculating its annual
contributions to the pension fund. 30
The Allied Court emphasized its prior decision in City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,131 which recognized an
insurer's special interest in being able to manage its risk exposure and
capital allocations, and found that "[t]he occurrence of major unfore-
seen contingencies . . . jeopardizes the insurer's solvency and, ulti-
mately, the insureds' benefits. Drastic changes in the legal rules
governing pension and insurance funds, like other unforeseen events,
can have this effect."'13 2 Thus, the Supreme Court has expressly noted
that legislation which significantly increases the potential insolvency
of an insurer by altering its obligations constitutes a substantial im-
pairment of contracts. The Moratorium Law and its progeny impose
this exact result.
The Moratorium Law also retroactively defeats the fundamental ex-
pectations of insurers under their policies. Both federal and state
courts have recognized that laws retrospectively affecting a party's
contractual termination or nonrenewal rights are an unconstitutional
impairment of contracts. 33 The courts have also recognized that the
retrospective imposition of new burdens upon a contracting party is
130. ld. at 245-46.
131. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
132. Id. at 721.
133. See, e.g., Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001 (4th Cit. 1980) (South Carolina
law abrogating an insurance company's rights to unilaterally terminate agency contracts); Globe
Liquor Co. v. Four Roses Distillers Co., 281 A.2d 19 (Del.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
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an unconstitutional impairment of contracts.' 3 4 For instance, in
Health Insurance Ass'n of America v. Harnett,3 ' the New York Court
of Appeals rejected a state law requiring insurers to add maternity
coverage to existing policies. Surely a regulatory scheme which abro-
gates an insurer's clear entitlement to cancel or nonrenew an existing
policy likewise constitutes an unconstitutional impairment.
Notwithstanding the compelling logic of the foregoing authorities,
advocates of the Moratorium Law will no doubt point to the few cases
in which mandatory renewal laws have been upheld. For instance, in
Sheeran v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,1a6 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court upheld the state's "No-Fault Act," which required in-
surers to renew automobile insurance policies as a condition of
conducting business in the state. The California Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukme-
jian.3 7 However, a close inspection of these decisions and the circum-
stances upon which they were based reveals fundamental distinctions
between the laws upheld in those cases and Florida's Moratorium Law
and its progeny.
First, the context of these decisions was automobile insurance poli-
cies, where the primary impairment caused by the mandatory renewal
laws was the imposition of a new monetary obligation that required
insurers to operate at a lesser profit for the benefit of the overall pub-
lic good.'38 The courts in these cases found that the impairments
placed upon insurers' contracts were not substantial when balanced
against the public need to have insurers carry a fair share of automo-
bile coverage. 3 9 Most significantly, the insurers in these cases were not
faced with the potential catastrophic loss which could occur from a
major hurricane and result in an insurer's immediate insolvency. In
contrast, the impairment caused by the Moratorium Law is over-
whelmingly more substantial in the context of property insurance,
where an insurer is not merely being required to operate at a loss or a
lesser profit, but rather is being compelled to subject its entire capital
resources to the risk of catastrophic loss.
134. See, e.g., Northshore Cycles, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 919 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1990) (Louisiana law requiring motorcycle manufacturers to repurchase inventory from
dealers under certain conditions); Davenport Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n v. Hospital Serv., Inc.,
154 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1967) (modification of the cost formula by which hospitals were reim-
bursed by Blue Cross).
135. 376 N.E.2d 1280, 1286-87 (N.Y. 1978).
136. 404 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1979).
137. 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
138. See Sheeran, 404 A.2d at 628; Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1249.
139. Sheeran, 404 A.2d at 631; Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1262-63.
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Second, and more importantly, the cases upholding the contractual
impairments did not disturb the insurer's ability to withdraw its busi-
ness from the state entirely if it found the nonrenewal law oppressive
or unbearable. For example, in finding no unconstitutional impair-
ment in Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian, the court expressly
noted that:
Proposition 103 [the renewal law] does not prevent an insurer from
discontinuing its California business . . . . The initiative did not
repeal [the state's statutory withdrawal provisions], and indeed
recognizes the possibility that insurers may withdraw from some
insurance markets by authorizing the commissioner to establish a
joint underwriting authority to serve such markets. 40
The Calfarm court thus made clear that the mandatory nonrenewal
law was not an unconstitutional impairment of an insurer's contrac-
tual rights, primarily because the insurer could still avoid the impair-
ment by exercising its right to withdraw as allowed by the state
insurance code.141
However, as previously discussed, the DOI's interpretation of the
Phaseout Statute effectively forecloses this option to Florida's insur-
ers. 142 Not only has Florida passed legislation which compels insurers
to participate in the Residential JUA, 143 but the DOI, by its proposed
rules, now seeks to force insurers to remain in the voluntary residen-
tial property market and to continue renewing policies, regardless of
the insurer's desire or need to withdraw from the market. Thus, an
insurer in Florida no longer possesses even its contractual right to can-
cel or nonrenew policies in connection with formal statutory with-
drawal-a right clearly incorporated into existing policies pursuant to
section 624.430, Florida Statutes.144 As such, the Moratorium Law
and Phaseout Statute alter the regulatory landscape in a manner
which enslaves an insurer's capital resources within its existing poli-
cies. Insurers neither expected nor agreed to such a condition when
entering into those contracts. Consequently, the Moratorium Law and
140. Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1262.
141. In fact, the California Supreme Court subsequently held that Proposition 103, the
state's mandatory renewal law, did not apply to insurers seeking to perfect their statutory with-
drawal from the state's insurance market. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gillespie, 785 P.2d 500,
501-02 (Cal. 1990).
142. See 20 Fla. Admin. Weekly 531, 533 (Feb. 4, 1994).
143. See ch. 92-345, 1993 Fla. Laws 1.
144. Neither the Moratorium Law nor the Phaseout Statute expressly amended or altered an
insurer's right to withdraw from a particular insurance market. See ch. 93-401, 1993 Fla Laws
2881; FLA. STAT. § 627.7013 (1993).
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its progeny, as interpreted and applied by the DOI, act as a substan-
tial impairment of an insurer's contracts.
2. The Moratorium Law Fails to Advance a Requisite Public
Purpose
Turning to the second prong of the Supreme Court's impairment
analysis, the Moratorium Law and its progeny fail to advance a signif-
icant and legitimate public purpose. A central element in deciding if
such a purpose exists is determining whether the law addresses broad
societal interests, rather than favoring certain private interests over
others.14 For a law to pass this prong of the federal impairment anal-
ysis, the legislation must not be for the mere advantage of particular
individuals, but rather for the protection of a basic interest of soci-
ety. l4
The Moratorium Law fails to meet this challenge as it does not rem-
edy a broad and general social or economic problem. Rather, the
Moratorium favors the interests of particular individuals-those Flor-
ida property insurance policyholders who have been or may be tar-
geted for cancellation or nonrenewal because of their choice to live in
high-risk areas-over the interests of the rest of Florida's homeown-
ers. The Moratorium Law in essence holds the capital resources of
insurers hostage to the individual interests of Florida policyholders,
and thus significantly reduces the capital that would otherwise be
available for investment or for backing the issuance of policies to
other prospective policyholders. This is especially true with regard to
insurers facing the prospect of insolvency, who must reduce their
overall exposure to risk in hurricane prone areas to protect the inter-
ests of both their remaining customers and their shareholders. The
Moratorium Law's protection of individual interests comes at a rather
high price to the majority of Florida's residential property insurance
consumers, whose coverage is not targeted for nonrenewal or cancella-
tion and who must now bear the increased risk of their insurance car-
rier becoming insolvent because it is unable to reduce its risk to
excessive exposure. 147 Clearly, an insolvent insurer is of little use to its
policyholders.
145. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12
(1983).
146. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978) (citing Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934)).
147. Even those insurers who have proposed the greatest number of cancellations or nonre-
newals, such as Allstate (proposed reduction of 25% of existing policies through nonrenewal)
and PRUPAC (proposed reduction of approximately 33% of existing policies), will continue to
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Another factor which reveals the Moratorium Law's lack of a com-
pelling public purpose is the issue of skyrocketing insurance prem-
iums. Given insurers' excessive exposure to nationwide catastrophic
loss, they recently have sought significant rate increases.'4 However,
the DOI's resistance to rate increases, coupled with the Moratorium
Law's prohibition on cancellations and nonrenewals, aggravated the
problem. Most insurers were undoubtedly compelled to some extent to
seek rate increases in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew regardless
of the Moratorium Law. However, it is naive to argue that the fre-
quency and quantity of the proposed rate increases are not connected
to the Moratorium Law's prohibition on cancellations and nonrene-
wal. In short, because insurers are unable to get to the root of the
problem by reducing their excessive risk exposure, they must seek
their only other option-raising premiums substantially in hopes of
quickly generating the surplus necessary to weather the next disaster.
Furthermore, insurers are not wholly to blame for the hefty rate
increases they have sought, as "reinsurance [costs] ha[ve] jumped as
much as 300% due to a string of disasters worldwide. '1 49 An insurer is
compelled to carry a certain amount of reinsurance to protect the sol-
vency of the insurance company, and the excess risk an insurer must
carry due to the Moratorium Law drives up those reinsurance costs.
In addition, the tremendous amount of insurance fraud which oc-
curred in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew and other recent natural
disasters has substantially affected insurers. In fact, falsified and in-
flated damage claims are expected to cost the insurance industry more
than $20 billion in 1994.150 It is a basic principle of the marketplace
that insurance companies must pass these types of costs on to the cus-
tomer. Therefore, a good portion of the increased costs imposed by
the Moratorium Law also fall upon the vast majority of the state's
homeowners, although they receive absolutely no benefit from the
moratorium, and would not have lost their coverage otherwise. In
sum, the Moratorium Law, which was promulgated under the guise of
the public's health, safety, and welfare, instead benefits a specific
class of homeowners in certain high-risk coastal areas of the state.
insure the majority of their current policyholders. See Crenshaw, supra note 12. Thus, the bene-
fit to the minority comes at the expense of the majority of policyholders who face a greater risk
of having an insolvent insurance carrier if insurers arc prohibited from reducing their exposure
to a reasonable level.
148. See Crenshaw, supra note 12. Some insurers, such as Allstate, have sought rate in-
creases of up to 60%. Note, however, that the DOI has resisted and, for the most part, denied
these requests.
149. See Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake of Disasters, supra note 7.
150. Janet L. Fix, Insurers Fear S20 Billion Fraud Toll, USA TODAY, June 14, 1994, at 131.
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This minimal benefit to a discrete minority comes at the overall ex-
pense of the collective majority of homeowner's insurance consumers
throughout the rest of the state. Consequently, the Moratorium Law
and its progeny fail to pass the second prong of the federal impair-
ment analysis.
3. The Moratorium Law Imposes an Unreasonable Restraint on
Contracts
Even assuming arguendo that the Moratorium Law passes the first
two prongs, it nevertheless fails the requirement that it be imposed
with reasonable conditions and be of a character appropriate to the
asserted legislative purpose. To meet this third prong of the contrac-
tual impairment test, a state law must be reasonable and necessary to
the accomplishment of an important public purpose. 5 ' If the asserted
public purpose could have been achieved by means less intrusive upon
contractual rights, the law unconstitutionally impairs those rights.'
The Moratorium Law's asserted purpose is the maintenance of an
orderly property insurance market in Florida, 53 which presumably en-
tails the continued availability of property insurance for Florida resi-
dents. However, the Legislature has already provided for the
accomplishment of this objective by enacting chapter 92-345, Laws of
Florida, which created the Residential JUA. The Residential JUA pro-
vides coverage to high-risk homeowners who cannot secure coverage
in the voluntary market, and requires all property insurers to bear
part of the risk and expense of this coverage. Thus, the Residential
JUA provides another means to assure residential property coverage
to Florida residents. This mechanism is far less intrusive upon insur-
ers' contractual nonrenewal and withdrawal rights than the Morato-
rium Law and its progeny, although it carries inherent dangers in its
own right.154 Granted, JUAs are not the most desirable source of resi-
dential property insurance, as they generally provide less complete
coverage at a greater rate than that found in the voluntary market.115
However, despite the apparent position of the Florida Legislature and
DOI, there is no constitutional or statutory guarantee which entitles
151. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
152. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820, 835 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
153. Ch. 93-401, 1993 Fla. Laws 2881.
154. See discussion infra, Part IV.
155. This is so because coverage which must be placed in a JUA is an "involuntary risk,"
meaning that private insurers generally will not write a policy on the property because of an
unacceptable probability of loss or damage to the property (i.e., beach-front homes located in
South Florida). Theoretically, a JUA is an insurer of "last resort," and the coverage provided
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Florida residents to the optimal or most affordable property insur-
ance. Rather, a Residential JUA, if structured and operated properly,
provides a workable framework for ensuring that high-risk homeown-
ers-who are the true beneficiaries of the Moratorium Law-can se-
cure adequate property insurance until the voluntary market
stabilizes.
The Residential JUA allocates its expenses and losses among all
Florida residential property insurers in proportion to market share,
and therefore provides availability of coverage without the Morato-
rium Law's disproportionate impact upon certain insurers who have
excessive exposure to risk from catastrophic losses. More signifi-
cantly, insurers have prior notice that they must participate in the
JUA as a condition of doing business in the state, unlike the retroac-
tive impairment of the insurers' contractual obligations caused by the
Moratorium Law and its progeny. Although Florida's Residential
JUA (as operated by the DOI) is increasingly becoming more of a dis-
ease than a cure, it offers an adequate, if not ideal, mechanism by
which to ease the state's property insurance woes without unnecessar-
ily intruding upon the contractual rights of insurers. Alternative me-
chanisms such as the JUA and other potential regulatory schemes
already meet the Legislature's goals, and are far less intrusive and op-
pressive than the Moratorium Law and the Phaseout Statute. In es-
sence, the Moratorium Law and its progeny eliminate an insurer's
contractual rights of nonrenewal and withdrawal simply to achieve the
same ends as the Residential JUA. Thus, the Moratorium Law and its
progeny fail to satisfy the third prong of the federal impairment anal-
ysis.
In sum, both the Moratorium Law and the Phaseout Statute, as
interpreted and applied by the DOI, substantially (if not irreparably)
impair an insurer's contractual rights of nonrenewal and withdrawal
by subjecting its capital resources to continued catastrophic loss. The
retrospective imposition of this onerous obligation upon insurers pri-
marily serves the interests of a particular class of individuals-current
policyholders faced with nonrenewal or cancellation-at the signifi-
cant expense of other homeowners throughout the state, and thus fails
to serve a broad social purpose. The asserted purposes of the Morato-
rium Law and its progeny can be achieved more fairly and with far
less disruption to the contractual rights of insurers by the Residential
by the JUA is not intended to compete with the private insurance market. Because insurers are
forced by law to carry a proportionate share of the increased risk and expense of underwriting
JUA risks, the coverage must necessarily be at a higher rate and with less complete coverage in
an attempt to contain the risk of loss assumed by insurers.
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JUA, or improved variations thereof. When balanced against the ac-
tual underlying interests it proposes to protect, the Moratorium Law
fails to qualify as a reasonable regulation or impairment of property
insurers' contractual rights, and is therefore unconstitutional under
the federal Contract Clause. Since Florida courts are even less tolerant
of contractual intrusion than are the federal courts, the Moratorium
Law and its progeny also violate Florida's Contract Clause. 56
C. The Moratorium Law Violates the Equal Protection Clause
A final constitutional objection to the Moratorium Law is presented
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that "[no State shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." 7 In essence, the Morato-
rium Law and its progeny compel property insurers doing business in
the state to commit capital to Florida and its resident policyholders,
thereby restricting the amount of capital available to write insurance
coverage in other states. This embargo of capital by the state of Flor-
ida has the economic effect of both restricting the supply of insurance
and raising the price of insurance in other states. This in turn causes
injury to non-Florida residents attempting to purchase insurance from
insurers subjected to the Moratorium Law. Moreover, the increased
risk of insolvency faced by insurers under the Moratorium Law not
only unduly prejudices existing policyholders in Florida, but also prej-
udices policyholders in other states whose interests in having a
healthy, solvent insurance carrier are thereby jeopardized. The effect
of the Moratorium Law and the Phaseout Statute is to control the
allocation of an insurer's capital resources, and to prohibit the re-
moval of those resources from the state at the expense of existing and
potential policyholders in other states. Such a regulatory scheme dis-
criminates against citizens of other states on the basis of their resi-
dency, and thus offends the Equal Protection Clause.
A state law which discriminates on the basis of residence violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless the statute has a legitimate state
purpose and is rationally related to the achievement of that purpose.,"8
In making this determination, a court must analyze two issues: (1)
whether the challenged legislation has a legitimate state purpose, and
(2) whether it is reasonable for lawmakers to believe that the use of
the challenged legislation would promote that purpose (i.e., whether
156. Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condominium, 378 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1979).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
158. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 666-67 (1981).
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the means are rationally related to the purpose of the legislation). 5 9
As this Comment will demonstrate, the Moratorium Law and its prog-
eny fail to support a legitimate state purpose. The author concedes
that assuming arguendo that the Moratorium Law and its progeny
were to pass the first prong of the equal protection analysis, it pre-
sumably also would pass the second prong of the analysis in light of
the Supreme Court's traditionally liberal "rationally related" test. 160
An application of the Equal Protection analysis to the Moratorium
Law is controlled by two decisions of the Supreme Court which set
forth the parameters for determining whether a statute which discrimi-
nates on the basis of residence promotes a legitimate state purpose. In
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,16' the Supreme Court
struck down an insurance regulatory scheme which was based on the
state's interest in promoting domestic business and encouraging capi-
tal investment in the state. The Court found that these purposes were
not legitimate when furthered by a statute that discriminated against
non-resident insurers, and held that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibits a state from favoring its own residents "by taxing foreign cor-
porations at a higher rate solely because of their residence."' 62 The
central premise of Ward is that, to pass constitutional muster under
the Equal Protection Clause, the purpose of a discriminatory statute
such as the Moratorium law must be other than to protect a state's
own citizens or industry. 163 Simply put, a statute which discriminates
based on residence for the purpose of protecting a state's own resi-
dents lacks a legitimate state purpose.
Under the reasoning in Ward, the Moratorium Law and its progeny
lack the requisite legitimate state purpose. As previously noted, the
Moratorium Law's embargo upon an insurer's capital resources pro-
tects a subset of Florida homeowners in disregard for the adverse ef-
fects such an embargo has on an insurer's existing and potential
policyholders in other states. Consider the severe adverse effect which
would befall Florida's residents if other states passed moratorium
laws which prevented insurers from managing and reallocating their
resources. Most insurers would not and could not conduct the busi-
ness of property insurance under such a uniform confiscatory regula-
tion scheme.
The Moratorium Law's lack of a legitimate state purpose under
159. Id. at 668.
160. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
161. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
162. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 875.
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Equal Protection Clause analysis is further illustrated by Western &
Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization.'6 In
Western, the Supreme Court examined California's retaliatory tax
structure to determine whether a tax on insurance premiums assessed
against foreign insurers violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 65 The
Court upheld the statute, finding that the effect of the tax structure
was to deter barriers to interstate commerce through the promotion of
interstate commerce by discouraging other states from imposing laws
which burdened out-of-state companies.' 6 Thus, the Court found that
the statute had a legitimate state purpose under the Equal Protection
Clause because its effect was to promote, rather than burden, the free
flow of interstate commerce. 167
In contrast, the effect of both the Moratorium Law and the Phase-
out Statute is to place an embargo upon an insurer's capital resources,
thereby erecting a barrier which absolutely prevents the flow of capital
resources from Florida to other states. This result effectively discrimi-
nates in favor of Florida residents, without regard to the impact or
effect it has on residents in other states. As such, the Moratorium
Law and its progeny lack a legitimate state purpose and therefore vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR ENSURING AN ORDERLY MARKET FOR
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE
A review of any daily newspaper reveals that Florida is not alone in
its concern over the apparent disarray of its property insurance mar-
ket. Almost every state in the country, particularly coastal states, is
experiencing some type of crisis in its property insurance market. In
states such as Hawaii, Louisiana, Delaware, Maryland, California,
and Virginia, property insurance is increasingly more expensive and
less available.'" Surely, the temptation to follow Florida and enact
moratorium laws or mandatory nonrenewal laws must be great. Nev-
ertheless, state regulators must resist this course as it has a potentially
devastating effect on the market for residential property insurance.
Property insurers simply cannot be compelled to subject their capital
resources to an unreasonable risk of excess exposure at the whim of
state legislatures. One can imagine the long-term market disarray
which will result if state legislatures throughout the nation rush to en-
act residential property insurance moratoriums every time a cata-
164. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
165. Id. at 649-50.
166. Id. at 673-74.
167. Id.
168. See Crenshaw, supra note 12.
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strophic hurricane, earthquake or flood occurs. Insurers cannot, and
undoubtedly will not, routinely conduct business under such confisca-
tory conditions. The DOI's recent attempts to chain insurers to the
state via the Moratorium Law and its progeny and then hold down the
price of property insurance in Florida despite huge increases in its
market value threaten Florida's economic future. If history is indeed
the best predictor of the future, insurers can only imagine what op-
pressive and confiscatory regulation will be imposed the next time a
catastrophic hurricane strikes the Florida coast.
The Residential JUA has the potential to fill the involuntary market
equitably until the voluntary market stabilizes, as it requires insurers
to contribute equally to any losses and thereby ensures that the burden
of maintaining an orderly market for insurance is distributed propor-
tionately among insurers. The Residential JUA is and should be a
short-term mechanism which provides coverage to only the most de-
serving consumers until they can assimilate into the voluntary market.
Unfortunately, former Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher and
the Residential JUA Board of Directors he appointed allowed the Res-
idential JUA to issue underpriced and undercapitalized insurance at a
startling rate.' 69 Moreover, the JUA's (including the Florida Property
and Casualty JUA or the "Condo JUA" as it is commonly known)
are so competitive that "people who don't even have a risk of losing
their insurance are canceling their policies and signing up."1 0 Former
Commissioner Gallagher's willingness to allow the Residential JUA to
write coverage at pre-Andrew rates to all comers threatened to trans-
form the Residential JUA into "the disease which it was supposed to
cure."'' The Legislature and Mr. Gallagher essentially created "the
Florida Insurance Company," but it is an insurer which is not subject
to the state's solvency regulation and which basically has no capital.
In 1994, the Residential JUA was the second largest underwriter of
homeowners' policies in the state, and its loss exposure was well over
$40 billion. 172 Given that almost every insurer doing business in the
state becomes directly liable for this loss exposure based on its per-
centage of market share, there is a overwhelming disincentive for in-
169. See Longman, supra note 8, at 32. Longman has noted that the JUA's are "handing
out underpriced and undercapitalized insurance in a manner reminiscent of the way Boss Tweed
once gave away Election Day turkeys." Id.
170. Id. (quoting state Rep. John F. Cosgrove, Dem., Miami).
171. In fact, the Residential JUA requested a 24% premium increase for homeowner's rates
in the early summer of 1994. Id. After holding the request for several months, Mr. Gallagher
finally authorized a 12% increase. Id. On October 10, 1994, after losing his bid for governor by
finishing third in the Republican primary, Mr. Gallagher ordered the Residential JUA to raise its
rates an average of 24%. Id.
172. Id.
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surers to begin writing new homeowner's coverage in the state."'
Thus, the DOI's recent regulatory actions have only exacerbated the
hesitancy of insurers to begin reinvesting in Florida.
Florida's legislators must place specific restrictions upon the Resi-
dential JUA and the Condo JUA so that they can function as insurers
of last resort, the role they were.designed to fill in the first place. This
includes strict eligibility standards and mandatory premiums which
are higher than those available in the voluntary market. Residential
JUA coverage should be available only to consumers whose polices
have been canceled by private insurers and who cannot get a new
quote in the voluntary homeowner's insurance market, and its availa-
bility must be restricted to consumers in high-risk coastal areas who
cannot secure coverage otherwise. Moreover, the Residential JUA
must be able to charge actuarially sound premiums so that it can build
up some meaningful level of surplus to meet a portion of its obliga-
tions when the next hurricane strikes and policyholders come calling.
Although the DOI has finally allowed premiums to rise to some ex-
tent,7 4 it may be too little too late. Finally, the DOI and the Residen-
tial JUA must develop an aggressive program aimed at depopulating
the JUA and assimilating its policyholders into the voluntary market.
In short, the Legislature and the DOI must focus on providing new
incentives, rather than new burdens and obligations, to lure existing
insurers back into the market and increase the potential for new insur-
ers filling niche areas of the market. This requires that insurers be
permitted to reduce their risk exposure when experience demonstrates
that it is has exceeded acceptable levels.
For example, an alternative available to Florida's insurance regula-
tors might have been to enact legislation which allowed insurers to
cancel or nonrenew a significant percentage of policies (e.g., at least
twenty-five to thirty percent) in critical areas over the next two or
three years to allow insurers to reduce their overwhelming risk of cata-
strophic loss quickly in hurricane prone areas. This likely would have
provided sufficient time for displaced policyholders in these areas to
find replacement policies in the voluntary market or seek coverage in
a properly operated Residential JUA without overburdening it. Al-
though the Phaseout Statute authorizes insurers to reduce a minimum
percentage of their risk annually, it does not provide enough immedi-
ate relief to protect insurers from the risk of insolvency in the next
few hurricane seasons. Most experts agree that Florida's residential
173. Id.
174. See Gallagher Raises Rates as Insurance for State, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 1994, at
A22.
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property insurance market will stabilize and rebound in a few years.1,
In fact, Robert Hunter, former president of the National Insurance
Consumer Organization and a leading proponent of the Moratorium
Law, has acknowledged that companies will gradually reenter the
market as prices rise and the fear of hurricanes abates. 76 The state's
insurance regulators could have, and should have, provided for an im-
proved Residential JUA to fill the involuntary market during this time
period without resorting to legislation which runs rampant over the
constitutional rights of insurers and places their continued existence in
jeopardy.
At a minimum, it must be remembered that the fundamental role of
state insurance regulators is to ensure the solvency of insurers and pre-
vent fraudulent behavior. 77 The goals of residential property insur-
ance availability and affordability are secondary to these critical
objectives, as these goals can be equalized and provided for to a
greater degree by a competitive free market for insurance. 78 In fact,
insurance commissioners in other states have commented that Flori-
da's insurers are prudently trying to reduce their exposure and thus
protect their solvency for the benefit of their remaining policyhold-
ers.179 As one insurance expert has stated, "[tlhese companies cannot
have these exposures next hurricane season . . . . To lock them into
these hot spots is the most ludicrous and dangerous thing you can
do."8 0
Unfortunately, the Moratorium Law and its progeny evidence the
Florida Legislature's and DOI's failure to heed this advice and fulfill
the primary objective of their regulatory duties. Indeed, former Insur-
ance Commissioner Tom Gallagher himself has admitted that the
Moratorium Law forces some insurance companies to carry risks they
may not be able to cover.' 8 ' Thus, rather than pursuing steps to ensure
the solvency of insurers and reach a compromise between insurers' in-
terests and those of the public, the Legislature and the DOI have per-
175. David Satterfield, Consumer Leader Says Time May Heal Insurance Crisis, MsAha HER-
ALD, July 28, 1993, at CI.
176. Id.
177. Stebing, supra note 43, at 280 (citing R. MEER ET AL., PRINCIPas oF INSURANCE 714
(1980)).
178. Id.
179. See Insurance Companies Retrench in Wake of Disasters, supra note 7 (quoting Massa-
chusetts Insurance Commissioner Linda Ruthardt as saying that "[ilt's much fairer than ignor-
ing that [risk] and having companies go insolvent").
180. Mark Silva, Insurance Cutbacks Inevitable, Expert Says, MIAaW HERALD, May 28, 1993,
at AI (quoting John Snyder, a senior analyst at A.M. Best, a New Jersey company that rates the
health of insurance companies).
181. Satterfield, supra note 12.
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sisted in subjecting residential property and casualty insurers and the
majority of their policyholders to the risk of ruin in the event of an-
other catastrophic hurricane. One commentator has noted that
[w]hile Gallagher and other Florida policyrnakers have succeeded in
keeping property insurance not only available but relatively cheap in
the short-term, their use of government fiat to accomplish this is
driving private insurance capital out of Florida and threatening to
impose huge, unnecessary and inequitable costs on the future." 182
This agenda is entirely for the benefit of a discrete and identifiable
class of individuals who choose to live in high-risk coastal areas. And
although Florida managed to escape the assault of a catastrophic hur-
ricane in 1994, the considerable damage inflicted by tropical storms
Alberto, Beryl and Gordon during the past season serves as an omi-
nous reminder that another hurricane of Andrew's magnitude will be
lurking off Florida's coast sometime in the future. Yet, as the hurri-
cane season approaches once again, the state's property and casualty
insurers have been pushed out on a limb by the Moratorium Law and
its progeny, and have been left hanging precariously in the wind.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Comment has demonstrated, the issues surrounding the
Moratorium Law and its progeny are not black and white, and the
interests of Florida's residential property insurers are not necessarily
adverse to the majority of the state's homeowners, as the DOI would
have insurance consumers believe. Rather, as one state senator has
opined, "if you don't have a good, healthy insurance industry, you're
not on the side of the consumer."'18 The existence of healthy, solvent
residential property insurers is the key to reestablishing a stable mar-
ket for homeowner's insurance in Florida. Even supporters of the
Moratorium Law have admitted that the law is "no substitute for a
strong, competitive insurance market."'" In the final analysis, the
state's enactment of oppressive and confiscatory legislation in reaction
to natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrew simply will not accom-
plish this goal and will instead drive responsible and competent insur-
182. Longman, supra note 8, at 32.
183. This remark was made by state Sen. John Grant, Repub., Tampa, co-chairman of the
1993 Study Commission on Property Insurance and Reinsurance. See Florida Insurance Rates
Likely to Skyrocket, CHIcAGo TIBtNE, Aug. 15, 1993, at T2. Unfortunately, the Legislature
and the Florida DOI have failed to embrace this seemingly simple truth.
184. More Evidence of Crisis, MtAb HAL dw, July 26, 1993, at AI0.
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ers from Florida, thereby propelling the state's increasingly crisis-
plagued residential property insurance market into further disarray.
